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Abstract 
Most proposals for legalizing cannabis production and sale ban 
sales to minors. But such bans are not self-executing. There is at least 
the risk—if not the overwhelming probability—that legal availability 
for adults will change price and availability for minors in a way that 
will increase the prevalence of underage use. This is especially prob-
lematic with respect to use by younger adolescents and to heavy use. 
It might be possible, with vigorous enforcement, to reduce the impact 
of legalization on use by minors, but the costs and unwanted side 
effects of such efforts may make them, on balance, inadvisable. The 
example of alcohol shows that it is possible to make it difficult for 
minors to buy directly from licensed stores and that doing so reduces 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms in the target popula-
tion. But strong efforts to prevent minors from buying cannabis ille-
gally from adults, who in turn buy it from licensed stores, may not be 
advisable. With minors now accounting for approximately 25 percent 
of the volume in the cannabis markets, giving strictly illicit producers 
and vendors a firmer grip on the underage market would undermine 
the goal of reducing illicit-market harms, including violence, the need 
for enforcement, and the supply of products of uncertain potency, 
perhaps containing harmful contaminants. If this is so, then the 
harms associated with increased juvenile use are not entirely separable 
from the decision to make cannabis lawfully available to adults. 
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Introduction 
As states, led by Colorado and Washington and now joined by 
Alaska and Oregon, begin to legalize commercial production and sale 
of cannabis, one concern is the risk of increasing use among minors. In 
the Department of Justice guidance on prosecution of state-legal 
cannabis-related activity, controlling access to minors is listed among 
the eight federal priorities.  
Most legalization proposals—including those passed in Colorado 
and Washington—forbid sales to purchasers under twenty-one, 
matching the rule about alcohol in all fifty states. But making a rule 
does not ensure that the rule will produce its desired results. Legally 
produced cannabis will still reach minors, either because minors 
succeed in purchasing directly from licensed outlets or because adult 
buyers illegally give or resell what they have legally purchased. 
The appropriate policy response is not obvious. If efforts to limit 
access are inevitably flawed, how vigorously should they be pursued? 
Should efforts focus only on suppressing store purchase or extend to 
include “gray markets”—meaning the diversion of product that would 
be legal for adults? These tensions also exist with alcohol and 
tobacco, but cannabis is different inasmuch as there already exists a 
large illicit supply system able and willing to deliver cannabis  
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products to minors. Suppressing gray-market access could 
inadvertently bolster that purely illicit market, undercutting two 
prime goals of cannabis legalization: reducing illicit activity and 
reducing cannabis-related arrests. 
This Article identifies three policy alternatives and contrasts their 
pros and cons. An “aggressive” approach seeks to suppress cannabis 
supply through all channels, even if in vain. A “permissive” approach 
grudgingly tolerates gray market access as preferable to black market 
supply. A “long game” approach begins permissively, waiting until the 
illicit market shrinks to some target level from which it might not 
easily rebound, and then imposes “aggressive” controls on all  
channels. 
I. Background 
Cannabis legalization appears increasingly to be a question of 
when and how, not whether. Washington and Colorado became the 
first jurisdictions to legalize commercial production, distribution, and 
sale of large-scale quantities for nonmedical use in 20121; Uruguay did 
so in 20132; Alaska and Oregon followed suit in 20143; and other 
states and nations are likely to follow.4 Just more than half of  
Americans (51%) support legalizing cannabis use.5 
Designing legal cannabis regimes requires policymakers to weigh 
competing goals, project the effectiveness and unintended conse-
quences of tactical choices, and perhaps consider some unorthodox 
strategies. Here we consider one such unorthodoxy: the possibility 
that legal-cannabis regimes should not try very hard to prevent youth 
from obtaining cannabis from cannabis stores, at least indirectly. 
That stands in complete contrast to all the received wisdom from the 
alcohol and tobacco literatures, but we argue that such a seemingly 
 
1. Maia Szalavitz, Two U.S. States Become First to Legalize Marijuana, 
Time (Nov. 7, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/11/07/two-u-s-
states-become-first-to-legalize-marijuana/.  
2. Daniel Cancel, Uruguay Becomes World’s First Nation to Legalize 
Marijuana, Bloomberg (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2013-12-11/uruguay-becomes-world-s-first-nation-to-legalize-
marijuana-trade.  
3. Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upshot/marij
uana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska-oregon-and-dc.html?abt=0002&abg=1. 
4. Washington, D.C. legalized possession and home-growing in 2014, but 
that is an entirely different matter than legalizing a for-profit industry, 
which is what raises much greater concerns with youth access.  
5. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., 
Gallup (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majority-
continues-support-pot-legalization.aspx. 
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perverse strategy may make a certain pragmatic sense, at least in the 
short to medium run.  
II. Harms and Policies 
In drug policy discussions it is often useful to distinguish among 
alternative means of reducing total drug-related harm: prevalence 
reduction, quantity reduction, and harm (or harmfulness) reduction.6 
If the only goal were to minimize youth use, it might be advisable to 
restrict all kinds of access to the maximum extent possible. However, 
even if one could somehow prevent twenty-one-year-olds from making 
proxy buys on behalf of their under-twenty-year-old friends, many of 
those under-twenty-year-olds might simply continue their current 
practice of buying on the black market. 
Black markets generate substantial harms above and beyond mere 
provision of the substance. Those harms include crime, violence, and 
corruption, but also a potentially more dangerous product, since 
black-market cannabis is not quality-tested or labeled for potency. So 
cannabis control policy faces a dilemma: minimizing the number of 
underage cannabis users might not minimize total harm once one 
factors in the harms of the black market. 
State and federal policies stress the importance of preventing 
increases in underage access. Their manifestations thus far focus on 
deterring state-licensed stores from selling to underage users, by way 
of frequent inspections and available sanctions. But these policies are 
not fully fleshed out and are likely to be guided also by competing 
goals, such as avoiding youth criminalization and reducing black 
market activity. (One of many unresolved questions with cannabis 
policy is how to define an “underage cannabis user.” Our usage of 
“underage” will follow Washington’s and Colorado’s law, since we 
suspect that their decision to make twenty-one the minimum legal age 
may be emulated in future legislation.)  
III. Outline 
The basic goals and frameworks of state-level cannabis control 
policy are outlined in Part IV.  
It is another question entirely to ask whether any given strategy 
will be successful in furthering its stated goals. That depends on how 
users respond to prohibition tactics and also how producers and 
distributors in the black and gray markets respond to enforcement 
pressure and to changing economic tides. For instance, if one method 
 
6. See Robert J. MacCoun, Toward a Psychology of Harm Reduction, 53 
Am. Psychologist 1199 (1988) (discussing the different “overlapping 
drug control strategies” of prevalence reduction, quantity reduction, and 
harm reduction). 
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of underage access is blocked, will that lower youth use of cannabis, 
or will youth simply access via other channels? Will the answer for 
today be the same as for ten years from now, when the legal cannabis 
economy is better established? Part V considers these dynamics. 
These issues are not unique to cannabis. Though cannabis has 
frequently been compared with alcohol—as in the tagline of 
Colorado’s Amendement Sixty-Four, “The Regulate Marijuana Like 
Alcohol Act”—in some respects a better comparison may be with 
tobacco. Cannabis currently supports a thriving black market; alcohol 
does not. Indeed, there remains considerable black market activity 
even in the two states that have already established legal markets. 
The mere act of legalization does not necessarily lead all criminals 
who had been supplying that drug to retire immediately. 
Tobacco is an intermediate case, with little to no black market 
but a substantial “gray market,” meaning illegal distribution and sale 
of product that is legally produced. Gray-market activity helps youth 
evade age prohibitions and all users evade taxes. Furthermore, there 
is the very real possibility that today’s tobacco companies may move 
into the marijuana product space after national legalization.7 Part VI 
reviews evidence on the effectiveness of retail enforcement intended to 
control youth access to alcohol and tobacco. Part VII applies these 
lessons to cannabis control in Washington and Colorado, showing 
where control efforts might be better or worse advantaged. 
A reasonable policy response would consider all these competing 
goals and form hypotheses about the intended and unintended effects 
from different tactics. Part VIII proceeds accordingly. First, it identi-
fies two dichotomous policy responses: an “aggressive” approach that 
attempts to combat all channels of cannabis access simultaneously 
and a “permissive” approach that tolerates some gray market access 
but maintains a strict prohibition on black-market sale. Later, we 
introduce another variant: a “patient” approach, which begins as 
permissive but later imposes aggressive-style controls. 
IV. State and Federal Policies to Limit Underage Use 
Even if one believes legalization can outperform prohibition, it 
still has disadvantages. So legalization schemes should be designed in 
ways that reduce those potential drawbacks—perhaps the most 
important of which is increased use, abuse, and dependence. 
 
7. Rachel Ann Barry, Heikki Hiilamo & Stanton A. Glantz, Waiting for 
the Opportune Moment: The Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legaliza-
tion, 92 Milbank Q. 207, 226–27 (2014). Since the 1970s, tobacco 
companies have expressed some interest in the cannabis industry, 
sometimes as a potential rival and sometimes as a potential industry 
which to enter. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Controlling Underage Access to Legal Cannabis 
546 
Use has been rising in the U.S. as policies have eased over the 
nearly twenty years since California first legalized medical cannabis in 
1996. “There are about seven times more heavy users now than there 
were in 1992.”8 Just over the past decade, the number of past-year 
and past-month users has increased by nearly 50 percent, and total 
annual use days doubled, since the number of people using daily or 
near-daily has increased even faster than has overall prevalence.9 
Harms are also up; the number of emergency department visits in 
which cannabis was mentioned increased by 70 percent between 2004 
and 2011, approaching half a million per year.10  
Underage use has also increased, although not as sharply:11 21.2% 
of high school seniors reported past-month use in 2014, up from 
historic lows of 18.3% in 2006 and an even lower 11.9% in 1992, but 
lower than the 25.2% mark in 2012 and 2013.12 Consumption by 
individuals under twenty-one accounts for between one-fifth and 
one-third of U.S. cannabis consumption.13 
What can be done about that? One well-accepted strategy for 
reducing underage alcohol and tobacco use is limiting underage access, 
and the same would be expected to apply to cannabis.14 Monitoring 
the Future data show that among tenth graders, two-thirds report 
that cannabis is “very easy” or “fairly easy” to get—similar to the 
 
8. Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Other Way to Legalize Marijuana, Slate 
(Nov. 4, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli
tics/politics/2014/11/d_c_marijuana_legalization_initiative_71_is_go
ing_to_pass_and_could_show.html. 
9. RAND Corp., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 
2000–2010, at 47–51 (2014). 
10. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, National Drug Con-
trol Strategy: Data Supplement 2013, at 58 (2013).  
11. Youth use has increased substantially among both youth who smoke 
cigarettes and those who do not, but there has been a sharp decline in 
tobacco smoking among youth, so the aggregate prevalence of marijuana 
use among all youth has not risen nearly so rapidly.  
12. Press Release, University of Michigan News Service, Use of Alcohol, 
Cigarettes, and a Number of Illicit Drugs Declines Among U.S. Teens 
tbl.3 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Teen Use Press Release], http://www. 
monitoringthefuture.org/pressreleases/14drugpr_complete.pdf. 
13. See Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results 
from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Summary of National Findings (2013) [hereinafter SAMHSA], 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/sda (authors’ calcula-
tions). 
14. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Developing Public Health Regulations for 
Marijuana: Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 1021, 1022 (2014). A regulatory approach to cannabis can learn 
from previous approaches to alcohol and tobacco, including taking as a 
goal the reduction of youth access. 
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corresponding proportions for cigarettes (69%) and alcohol (75%) and 
dramatically higher than for “hard drugs” like cocaine (16%), heroin 
(11%), and methamphetamine (10%).15 
On paper, Washington and Colorado have responded vigorously. 
Their laws have embraced a number of public health regulations 
intended to limit underage use of alcohol and tobacco: a twenty-one-
year minimum age to purchase; bans against cannabis vendors selling 
non-cannabis products; bans on underage entry to cannabis stores; 
restricting availability of retail licenses; bans against retail stores 
within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, or other public places; and 
restrictions on advertising, particularly if targeting youth.  
The federal government has likewise made its priorities clear. In 
August 2013 it signaled willingness to allow states to proceed with 
regulated cannabis markets but threatened to enforce the federal drug 
laws against cannabis distribution unless states meet eight guidelines 
concerning public health and safety, including “[p]reventing the 
distribution of marijuana to minors.”16 
Whether in anticipation of or simply in common purpose with this 
federal position, Washington and Colorado have been vocal about 
plans to prevent youth from purchasing from cannabis stores. A pillar 
of their strategy is to enforce underage purchasing laws by using 
minors in “controlled buys” of cannabis, as illustrated by statements 
from Colorado Department of Revenue official: “‘This is going to be a 
big focus of our field enforcement going forward’”17; and from the 
Washington Liquor Control Board’s enforcement chief: “Of course the 
feds are looking at a tightly regulated market around youth access, 
and I think this shows we’re being responsible.”18 
Presumably, policymakers in Washington and Colorado are also 
considering methods to prevent the gray market diversion of cannabis, 
perhaps by enforcing laws prohibiting underage possession, use, and 
purchase (“PUP”) or arresting and/or shaming consenting adults 
from state-licensed cannabis to underage users. That stance has not 
 
15. Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.3. 
16. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. 
Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 1 (Aug. 29, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382
9132756857467.pdf?utm_source=publish2&utm_medium=referral&utm
_campaign=www.kpbs.org.  
17. Fred Dreier, Underage Recreational Cannabis Sales Targeted in “Secret 
Shopper” Program, Marijuana Business Daily (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://mmjbusinessdaily.com/colorado-gov-rolls-out-secret-shopper-
program/. 
18. Bob Young, Underage Enforcers Will Try to Sting New Pot Stores, 
Seattle Times (Nov. 29, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnew
s/2022364828_potstingsxml.html. 
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yet been taken—at least not publicly—but remains available and 
might be adopted in the future. 
A. Other Goals 
Yet, underage use is not the only concern relevant to cannabis 
legalization; nor is it necessarily the most important. On this point, 
states, the federal government, and the public agree. This has been 
manifested in legal documents. The texts of Initiative 502, Amend-
ment Sixty-Four, and Department of Justice enforcement priorities 
mention a number of other issues such as state and local tax revenue; 
removing cannabis distribution from the hands of criminal organiza-
tions; individual freedom; and the efficient use of law enforcement 
resources. Below we considered three goals relevant to different policy 
responses, which may at times compete with the goal of reducing 
underage use. 
B. Avoiding the Criminalization of Youth and Adults 
The policing of cannabis production and distribution generates 
significant, though often exaggerated, tolls in arrests and incarcera-
tion. Several tens of thousands of people are currently incarcerated for 
cannabis distribution, and roughly 100,000 are arrested annually.19 If, 
after legalization, a black market persists to serve underage users, 
some amount of this enforcement and associated costs will also likely 
continue.  
Yet, even if arrests for production and distribution went to zero, 
the total number of cannabis arrests could still increase. The great 
majority of cannabis arrests are for possession rather than for drug 
sale or manufacture. Some types of possession or use remain illegal 
(e.g., use in public, possession in excess of allowed quantities) and so 
will continue to send adults to jail. Enforcement of rules and regula-
tions can be a non-negligible source of criminalization: every year in 
the United States, nearly 700,000 more arrests are made for alcohol 
violations than for drug law violations of all kinds (not just 
cannabis).20 
Youth arrests are of special interest. Arrest for possession by 
those under twenty-one will presumably continue and, if prohibitions  
19. Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: What 
Everyone Needs to Know 47–50 (2012). “About 40,000 state and 
federal prison inmates have a current conviction involving cannabis; 
perhaps half of those are in prison on cannabis offenses only.” Id. at 50. 
20. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 
2012, at tbl.29, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/ 
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/29tabledatadecpdf. The FBI reports 
that in 2012 there were an estimated 1,552,432 arrests for (non-alcohol-
related) “drug abuse violations,” compared with 1,282,957 for (alcohol-
related) “driving under the influence,” 441,532 for “liquor laws,” and 
511,271 for “drunkenness.” Id. 
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are aggressively enforced, even increase. That pattern has already 
been demonstrated by the experience with alcohol: increases in the 
alcohol minimum age from eighteen to twenty-one have been 
associated with increased rates of arrest in that age range.21 In states 
with laws against possession, use, and purchase, either pertaining to 
alcohol or to tobacco, arrests and prosecutions are disproportionately 
focused on minors rather than adults or retailers.22 
C. Eliminating Black Markets and Improving Public Safety 
So long as they are operating, illicit cannabis markets fund 
criminal organizations. They even create opportunities and incentives 
for violence, albeit to a much lesser extent than do the markets for 
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.23 Still, a study published by 
the RAND Corporation estimated that the cannabis trade delivered 
$1.5 billion in revenues to Mexican drug trafficking organizations, 
accounting for 15–26 percent of their drug-related revenues.24 While 
some black market cannabis is grown domestically, historically much 
has been imported from Mexico. One of the principle appeals of 
legalization is the potential to undermine these black markets. Yet, 
were the approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of demand that comes 
from underage users still met with black market supplies, that would 
diminish this important potential benefit of legalization. Likewise, any 
 
21. Mark Wolfson & Mary Hourigan, Unintended Consequences and Pro-
fessional Ethics: Criminalization of Alcohol and Tobacco Use by Youth 
and Young Adults, 92 Addiction 1159, 1161 (1997). 
22. See Alexander C. Wagenaar & Mark Wolfson, Enforcement of the Legal 
Minimum Drinking Age in the United States, 15 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 
37, 45 (1994) (noting that based on detailed data for Oregon, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and Montana, for every 1,000 arrests of a minor for underage 
possession of alcohol, there were only 88 adults over the age of twenty-
one arrested and 130 retailers sanctioned or warned for supplying 
alcohol to underage users); see also Jean L. Forster et al., Survey of City 
Ordinances and Local Enforcement Regarding Commercial Availability 
of Tobacco to Minors in Minnesota, United States, 5 Tobacco Con-
trol 46, 49–50 (1996) (showing that “more than 90% of cities reported 
some action to enforce the law against tobacco purchase, possession, or 
use by minors . . . This is especially noteworthy compared to 25% of 
cities that reported some enforcement action against merchants for 
selling tobacco to minors, and less than 10% where penalties were 
applied”). 
23. See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Towards a Harm-Reduction 
Approach to Enforcement, 8 Safer Communities 9, 15–16 (2009) 
(discussing the differences in risks of harm in various forms of drug 
dealing). 
24. Beau Kilmer et al., Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and 
Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California 
Help? 3 (2010). 
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effort that quickens the demise of black market activity in turn 
reduces these dangers. 
D. Introducing Cannabis Public Health Regulations 
There is considerable speculation about the safety of legal 
cannabis relative to black market cannabis. On the one hand, all 
cannabis is a dependence-inducing intoxicant, regardless of whether it 
is sold through state-regulated stores or the black market. On the 
other hand, those states with legal cannabis require it be tested and 
labeled for product potency (i.e., percentage of THC, CBD, and other 
active ingredients) and purity (e.g., absence of mold, mites, 
pesticides). Further, in its nonherbal forms it must be packaged to 
clearly demarcate each standard 10mg THC serving size and instruct 
users on safe use. Assuming that cannabis stores resemble existing 
medical dispensaries, their inventory will feature edibles and concen-
trates, which, though they reduce damage to the lungs, can vary 
wildly in their quality and potency.25 Conceptually, it might help to 
think of the relative health benefits of legal cannabis in terms of 
upper and lower bounds. The lower bound may actually be negative, 
if one believes non-herbal cannabis to be especially dangerous and 
testing and packaging regulations to be ineffective at reducing those 
risks. The upper bound is certainly much lower than for a drug such 
as heroin, which in its controlled form reduces risk of lethal overdose, 
though may still be substantial (particularly if one believes that 
potency labeling can shift popular taste toward less-potent varieties). 
To the extent that cannabis continues to be purchased through black 
markets rather than gray or white markets, these potential health 
benefits (or arguably potential costs) are left on the table. 
 
V. Methods of Underage Access and 
Forecasts for Parallel Markets 
To make cannabis control policy, it is not enough for 
policymakers to choose with goals to prioritize and which to let slide. 
They must question whether a policy is likely to achieve its stated 
goal; further, will there be important secondary outcomes? Ultimately 
the answers will come down to circumstantial details, including how 
underage users respond to prohibition tactics and how methods of 
cannabis supply respond to changing demand and economic factors. 
Precisely how youth access cannabis can be viewed along several 
dimensions: origin of supply, relationship with the immediate 
 
25. Annie Lowrey, Now 20% More Heady, N.Y. Times Mag., May 18, 
2014, at 16. Among Colorado medical dispensaries, many cannabis 
products are not tested for potency and, even then, are not often done 
so accurately. 
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provider, and nature of the transaction. The National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health (“NSDUH”) asks users how they most recently 
acquired cannabis. Among past-month users under age twenty-one, 
nearly all (88%) accessed from friends or family and many of them for 
free (44%). Only 10 percent reported purchasing from a stranger.26 
(This general pattern is not new.27) 
Here, the origin of supply is almost entirely from cannabis black 
markets; only a tiny, but increasing, fraction of cannabis users report 
buying from a medical dispensary or growing their own. Cannabis 
black markets are of enormous scale, having recently displaced co-
caine as the largest illegal drug market in the United States and are 
estimated to serve eighteen to twenty-five million past-month users 
with revenues of $30–60 billion.28 Underage users are not only wel-
come into that market—with Monitoring the Future data showing 
that two-thirds of tenth graders reporting that cannabis is “very easy” 
or “fairly easy” to get—29but underage users are also a significant 
portion of the entire market, as consumption by individuals under 
twenty-one accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of U.S. canna-
bis consumption.30 
This might change under legalization, since it opens a new and 
legal source of supply.31 Adults purchasing from those sources are 
taking part in what might be called the “white market.” But many 
other adults do not. Others may continue to take to black markets to 
purchase cannabis that has been produced wholly outside these new 
legal frameworks. Though underage users are prohibited by law from 
the new market, still some will gain access via the “gray market,” in 
which adults buy legally from stores and then resell or give the drug 
away to youth and young adults who are under twenty-one. This 
occurs today with alcohol and tobacco, and so underage drinking and 
smoking continues even without relying on black market supply. The 
 
26. See SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations).  
27. See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Marijuana Mark-
ets: Inferences from Reports by the Household Population, 36 J. Drug 
Issues 173, 178 tbl.2 (2006) (showing that in the 2001 survey most 
respondents acquired their marijuana from friends or relatives).  
28. RAND Corp., supra note 9, at 4. The upper bound for an estimate of 
retail expenditures on marijuana surpassed that of cocaine in 2009. 
29. Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.13.  
30. See SAMHSA, supra note 10 (authors’ calculations). 
31. At present, sources of supply that are legal with respect to Colorado and 
Washington law remain completely illegal with respect to federal law, 
but we are writing in anticipation of a time when either federal cannabis 
prohibition has been repealed or the Obama Administration’s current 
policy of nonenforcement within states that have legalized has been 
formalized in some manner.  
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gray market functions well enough that there is little scope for purely 
illegal moonshining and even less for covert tobacco farming. (Home-
growing cannabis is much more practical than home-growing 
tobacco.) 
Yet, the opening stages of cannabis legalization will play out with 
an active black market, which might shrink in the coming years but 
probably will not vanish, at least until legalization is national. For 
instance, much of the cannabis produced illegally in Washington was 
exported to other states even before legalization;32 legalizing supply 
within Washington does nothing to reduce that demand. In a 
competition between the established black market and the emerging 
licit markets, the black market has the advantages of starting out 
with all the customers and also cost-savings in the form of evading 
state-imposed taxes on cannabis production and sale (roughly 38% in 
Washington and 25% in Colorado). 
In the long run, these tables will probably turn, given the 
advantages of a well-capitalized and licit industry. Iowa farmers and 
convenience store chains are massively more efficient at producing 
and distributing consumer goods than are criminals: a RAND study 
estimates that fully commercialized firms could provide cannabis at 
less than one-fifth current prices, excluding taxes.33 However, that 
transition may take years to complete. In the meantime, black mark-
ets offer a fallback option for youth and young adults rejected from 
state-licensed stores.  
So the near future for legal cannabis states will feature large but 
waning black markets alongside small but growing gray markets. 
Already, gray markets have emerged in medical cannabis states. 
Nearly three-quarters of adolescents in substance abuse treatment in 
the Denver area reported using someone else’s medical cannabis.34 And 
despite the roll-out of cannabis stores in Washington and Colorado, 
signs indicate the black market remains strong, or at least has not 
disappeared overnight. 
Neither gray nor black markets are easily eliminated by 
enforcement policies, although they may be weakened. Gray markets 
 
32. See Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., How Much Revenue Could 
the Cannabis Tax Generate, Under Different Scenarios? 25 
(2013) (noting that marijuana exports could comprise a large percentage 
of Washington’s marijuana revenues). 
33. See Beau Kilmer et al., Altered State? Assessing How Mari-
juana Legalization in California Could Influence Marijuana 
Consumption and Public Budgets 18–21 (2010) (estimating future 
prices for marijuana based on increased efficiencies and lowered costs of 
production if marijuana were legalized). 
34. Stacy Salomonsen-Sautel et al., Medical Marijuana Use Among Adolesc-
ents in Substance Abuse Treatment, 51 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adol-
escent Psychiatry 694, 697 (2012). 
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are fueled by a profit opportunity that enforcement cannot easily 
remove: after legalization, cannabis will remain difficult to acquire by 
users under twenty-one years old but easy to acquire by adults who 
can simply buy from state-licensed stores. So “proxy buyers” can 
make a quick profit by arbitraging cannabis to the prohibited demo-
graphic. Indeed, this activity is so easy for tobacco and alcohol today 
that many proxy buyers do not even charge for the service. Law 
enforcement efforts can make that more difficult, and so harder to 
make a profit doing it, but cannot resolve the underlying imbalance in 
supply and demand.  
So making the right decisions about enforcement policy hinges on 
anticipating dynamics of gray and black market activity. The stronger 
these markets, the easier for youth to circumvent restrictions against 
store access via access through social networks. How these gray mark-
ets will play out in states after legalizing cannabis is still unclear and 
is the central question addressed here.  
VI. Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco 
The approach taken by Washington and Colorado thus far is 
reminiscent of efforts with tobacco and alcohol, which proved to be 
largely successful. Key to their announced efforts is a focus on deter-
ring vendors from selling to underage users, by way of frequent 
inspections and available sanctions. That focus was not stressed in 
alcohol or tobacco control until the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, 
with the Synar Amendment as pertaining to tobacco control.35 These 
policies appeared to have substantial effects, even though compliance 
is far from perfect, as the following decades saw steadily declining 
rates of underage access to alcohol and tobacco.  
However, correlation is not causation, and what worked for to-
bacco might not work for cannabis. Working from the literature on 
alcohol and tobacco control, we will identify lessons concerning (1) 
attempts to control store purchase and (2) alternate modes of access; 
(3) the costs of enforcement; and (4) the “push-down pop-up” 
dynamic across different modes of access.  
We focus primarily on tobacco rather than alcohol. One reason is 
the similarities between cannabis and tobacco. Tobacco is lightweight, 
portable, and smokeable, and it supports significant gray- and black-
market activity. Alcohol’s lower value-to-weight ratio makes it more 
difficult to covertly transport and sell. Others might object that 
alcohol is a better comparator because it has a minimum purchase age 
of twenty-one years old and has already undergone a change from full 
prohibition to full legalization. Thus, occasionally comparisons with 
alcohol will also be helpful.  
35. ADAMHA Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 1926, 106 Stat. 
323, 394–95 (1992). 
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A. Controlling Store Access 
Policies against underage store purchases can be effective only 
when enforced. A 1992 Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Inspector General report found that even though forty-
seven states had enacted laws against underage purchase of tobacco, 
only two states had backed those laws with substantial enforcement.36 
Shortly afterward, Congress passed the Synar Amendment to the 
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration Reorganiza-
tion Act, which requires (and monitors) state enforcement of tobacco 
laws, including undercover buys against vendors.37 This yielded im-
pressive results. Nationwide retailer violation rates as measured from 
undercover buys dropped from 40.1% in the first year of reporting 
(1997) to 25.4% in 1998, and since 2006 they have remained between 
8.5% and 10.9%.38 The same trend is apparent in youth self-reports of 
cigarette availability, although not as strongly. Monitoring the Future 
asked students, “How difficult do you think it would be for you to get 
cigarettes, if you wanted some?” The percentage of tenth graders 
answering “fairly easy” or “very easy” peaked at 91 percent in 1996, 
dropped to 87 percent by 2000, and since has continued to steadily 
drop through to 69 percent in 2014.39 
Though these gains are real, there are some caveats. Lancaster 
and Stead argue that vendor compliance rates might not materially 
affect underage access to store purchase until they’re pushed above 80 
percent, since youth can do a number of things that inspectors 
cannot, including using fake IDs, visiting multiple stores, establishing 
familiarity with vendors, and targeting those stores with reputations 
for not checking ID.40 Moreover, youth often resell or share what they 
acquire to their friends, and so a small number of noncompliant stores 
can supply a large number of underage users. 
So some youth will feel these effects more than others. Older 
youth and more frequent users are more likely to access tobacco via 
store purchase—an act that younger users generally find more diffi-
 
36. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Youth Access to Tobacco 5 
(1992) (“Florida and Vermont are the only States enforcing their laws 
statewide.”).  
37. ADAMHA Reorganization Act § 1926 (setting state requirements and 
penalties for failing to meet those requirements). 
38. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., FFY 2013 
Annual Synar Reports: Tobacco Sales to Youth 2 fig.1 (2013). 
39. Teen Use Press Release, supra note 12, at tbl.13.  
40. Lindsay F. Stead & Tim Lancaster, A Systematic Review of Intervent-
ions for Preventing Tobacco Sales to Minors, 9 Tobacco Control 
169, 175 (2000). 
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cult to get away with and less frequent users might find unnecessary.41 
Indeed, one study associated increased enforcement with the preval-
ence of fewer frequent users.42 Perhaps counterintuitively, it is not 
older but younger youth who have displayed stronger reductions in 
use,43 perhaps as a function of younger youth having to rely on older 
youth to procure tobacco for them. Thus, even if enforcement policies 
do not prevent youth tobacco initiation, they may still delay initia-
tion44 or limit youth from intensifying their habit.  
B. Controlling Other Forms of Access 
By most measures, social sources are a bigger provider of alcohol 
and tobacco to youth than store access is. A “social source” is an 
umbrella term that includes many other more specific methods, 
including adult supply from home, proxy buyers, and peer-to-peer 
exchange. The NSDUH household survey illustrates the prevalence of 
these methods, asking past-month cigarette smokers which sources 
they had used in the past thirty days. In 2003, the most recent year 
the question was asked, the most common response was to have 
“bummed” cigarettes from friends (60%), followed by purchasing from 
a store (53.3%) and purchasing from a friend, family member, or 
classmate (30.5%).45 Alcohol access also shows high rates of noncom-
mercial exchange but lower rates of store purchase. According to 
NSDUH, past-month under-twenty-one alcohol users were most likely 
to have acquired their most recent drink by receiving it for free 
(71.8%) and somewhat likely to have purchased from friends or a 
stranger (19.6%) but much less likely to have purchased from a store 
(6.4%).46  
41. Jean L. Forster et al., The Effects of Community Policies to Reduce 
Youth Access to Tobacco, 88 Am. J. Pub. Health 1193, 1196–97 
(1998). 
42. K. Michael Cummings et al., Is the Prevalence of Youth Smoking 
Affected by Efforts to Increase Retailer Compliance with a Minor’s 
Access Law?, 5 Nicotine & Tobacco Res. 465, 469 (2003). 
43. David G. Altman et al., The Relationship Between Tobacco Access and 
Use Among Adolescents: A Four Community Study, 48 Soc. Sci. & 
Med. 759, 772 (1999). 
44. See Douglas Tutt et al., Restricting the Retail Supply of Tobacco to 
Minors, 30 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 68, 77 (2009) (suggesting this trend 
can be found in studies of the effects of increased enforcement on age-
restricted tobacco sales in parts of Australia and New Zealand). 
45. Jessica Guilfoyle, Where Do Youth Smokers Get Their Cigarettes?, 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (June 15, 2012), http://www.slo 
county.ca.gov/Assets/PH/TCP/WhereDoYouthGetTheirCigarettes2012.pdf. 
46. SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations). Alcohol drinkers are 
asked specifically about how they acquired their most recent acquisition. 
Answers to this question are mutually exclusive and so are not directly 
comparable to the question on cigarette acquisition. 
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Let’s be specific about how this access occurs. Conceptually, there 
are two different ways for users to purchase from a third party or 
“proxy buyer”: (1) by seeking out a specific person known to resell 
alcohol or (2) by waiting outside an alcohol store and soliciting 
incoming shoppers, a method known as “shoulder tapping.” The 
NSDUH does not distinguish between these two methods, but a study 
of Minnesota youth found that one in three tobacco seekers regularly 
shoulder tapped, more than twice as many reporting direct purchase.47 
A study with alcohol found success rates of 8 percent when soliciting 
the first adult to enter the store and 19 percent when targeting males 
appearing to be between twenty-one and thirty years old.48 
Now that we have covered the methods by which underage users 
obtain alcohol and tobacco, we naturally should ask, “How and to 
what extent can policy limit those behaviors?” PUP laws—laws 
against underage possession, use, and purchase—attempt to do just 
that but are not unambiguously effective. Some studies have found a 
statistical correlation between PUP laws and tobacco use49 but not 
others.50 
However, if PUP laws are indeed effective in reducing underage 
access, it is through one of two causal pathways: (1) changing social 
norms to make access and use less attractive to youth and (2) 
imposing a threat of criminal risk sufficient to deter youth from 
attempting access. The first proposition is also unclear. Some argue 
that prohibitory laws have a declarative effect that changes social 
norms to make tobacco use less attractive. Others fear that such laws 
 
47. Patricia A. Harrison et al., The Relative Importance of Social Versus 
Commercial Sources in Youth Access to Tobacco, Alcohol, and Other 
Drugs, 31 Preventive Med. 39, 43 (2000). 
48. Traci L. Toomey et al., Propensity for Obtaining Alcohol Through 
Shoulder Tapping, 31 Alcoholism: Clinical & Experimental Res. 
1218, 1220 (2007). 
49. See William C. Livingood et al., Impact Study of Tobacco Possession 
Law Enforcement in Florida, 28 Health Educ. & Behav. 733, 743 
(2001) (finding lower use of tobacco with higher levels of control and 
enforcement); see also Leonard A. Jason et al., Effects of Youth Tobacco 
Access and Possession Policy Interventions on Heavy Adolescent 
Smokers, 6 Int’l J. Envtl. Res. & Pub. Health 1, 6 (2009) (“These 
studies support the efficacy of combined approaches involving efforts to 
both reduce youth access to tobacco as well as provide consequences for 
adolescent use of tobacco. This current research suggests that the 
enforcement of PUP laws does impact youth who smoke 20 or more 
cigarettes daily.”). 
50. See, e.g., N.H. Gottlieb et al., Minors’ Tobacco Possession Law 
Violation and Intentions to Smoke: Implications for Tobacco Control, 13 
Tobacco Control 237, 240, 243 (2004) (finding that threat of citation 
for possession of cigarettes had no statistically significant impact on 
youth smoking rates). 
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brand drug use as a “forbidden fruit,” making it more attractive to 
youth seeking rebellion. 
On the second point, of deterring youth via criminal risk, we have 
grounds for skepticism. Deterrence comes in two types: general deter-
rence intends to reduce the unwanted activity among the public at 
large; specific deterrence refers to behavior change among individuals 
caught and punished for committing the unwanted activity. Some 
have found evidence for a specific deterrent.51 Yet, in the case of alco-
hol and tobacco, there are very many users seeking the drug but so 
few are ever caught and punished for it. This limits the effect of a 
specific deterrent and makes a general deterrent both more important 
and more difficult to impose: when levels of an unwanted activity are 
high, the enforcement required to effect a general deterrent often 
exceeds the resources available to law enforcement.52 Indeed, Wake-
field and Giovino were unable to find any jurisdictions implementing 
PUP laws that caught enough violators as to do so.53 For instance, 
California’s Alcohol Beverage Control made roughly 430 arrests in 
shoulder-tapping stings in 2013, which might represent a 0.5% chance 
of detection.54 
Interactive dynamics between law-breakers and law-enforcers 
makes a general deterrent even more difficult. Law-breakers respond 
to the threat of detection by making deals out of sight of police and 
only with people they already trust; so even if police succeed in 
 
51. See, e.g., Leonard A. Jason et al., Do Fines for Violating Possession-
Use-Purchase Laws Reduce Youth Tobacco Use?, 37 J. Drug Educ. 
393, 397–98 (2007) (analyzing the effects of fines as a deterrent). 
52. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Enforcement Swamping: A Positive-Feedback 
Mechanism in Rates of Illicit Activity, 17 Mathematical & 
Computer Modelling 65, 70 (1993) (finding that adjudication and 
nonpecuniary penalties often carry a high cost and that ticketing en-
forcement regimes are zero sum games for municipalities). 
53. M. Wakefield & G. Giovino, Teen Penalties for Tobacco Possession, 
Use, and Purchase: Evidence and Issues, Tobacco Control, June 
2003 (Supplement 1), at i6, i11. 
54. According to the 2011–2012 NSDUH, 185,000 respondents under 
twenty-one years old in California reported acquiring their last alcoholic 
beverage by giving money to some unrelated person twenty-one years or 
older and having them make the purchase on their behalf. If we were to 
make the assumptions (1) conservatively, that each respondent acquired 
only once per year this way; (2) that all such purchases were of the 
“shoulder-tapping” variety (i.e., solicited outside the store); (3) that 
each buyer made only one purchase; and (4) that 2011 and 2012 had the 
same number of arrests as in 2013, then each buyer would face a 0.46% 
chance of arrest. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. 
Admin., Results from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health: Summary of National Findings (2012) (authors’ 
calculations). 
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scaring people from giving alcohol or tobacco to a minor in public, 
they might still feel comfortable doing so at home. 
Further, when sellers are profit-motivated, they are harder to 
deter. Profit-motivated sellers may choose to tolerate significant risk 
so long as the activity remains profitable on balance.55 Moreover, 
removing (via incarceration or deterrent) one specific individual dis-
tributor becomes less valuable, since doing so to some extent opens up 
a market niche for another distributor. 
C. Interactions Between Store and Social Sources 
How do these two types of access relate? In some sense, they are 
complements: easy access to cannabis encourages more youth to use, 
some of whom will themselves become cannabis sellers. Because 
cannabis is usually sold within someone’s own social network, and 
social networks are usually within the same age group, preventing one 
youth from purchasing from a store might have the downstream effect 
of blocking one method of supply to his friends. 
In another sense, they are substitutes: when store access is cut off, 
underage users turn to these other sources instead. A young user 
might have a friend willing to share or sell; but if that is too hard, 
older actors may step up to the role of distributor. Marsh et al. argue 
that reductions in store access can drive up the price of informally 
traded product, thereby increasing profits and attracting more dis-
tributors.56 
Since both arguments proceed logically from sound premises, 
resolving that contradiction is an empirical question: “effective 
enforcement against store purchase causes some youth to direct their 
efforts to social access instead; does the increase in social access 
outweigh the decrease in store access?” On this experts are not in 
agreement. Some would answer yes,57 others no,58 and still others are 
 
55. See Peter Reuter & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Drug Enforcement, 7 Crime & Just. 289, 302–03 
(1986) (discussing the different types of risk calculations involved in the 
illicit drug trade). 
56. Louise Marsh et al., “When You’re Desperate You’ll Ask Anybody”: 
Young People’s Social Sources of Tobacco, 37 Austl. & N.Z. J. Pub. 
Health 155, 159 (2013). 
57. See, e.g., Caroline M. Fichtenberg & Stanton A. Glantz, Youth Access 
Interventions Do Not Affect Youth Smoking, 109 Pediatrics 1088, 1091 
(2002) (finding no benefit to “[y]outh access interventions” in reducing 
prevalence of teen tobacco use); see also P.M. Ling et al., It Is Time to 
Abandon Youth Access Programmes, 11 Tobacco Control 3, 3 (2002) 
(discussing how youth access programs “do not affect teen smoking 
prevalence”). 
58. See, e.g., J.R. DiFranza, Letter, Is It Time to Abandon Youth Access 
Programmes?, 11 Tobacco Control 282, 282 (2002) (discussing flaws 
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agnostic.59 Nor is there consensus on the subtly different question, 
“Does decreased retail availability actually lead to decreased underage 
use?” This has been the subject of econometric analyses, again with 
some finding significant statistical associations60 but others finding no 
relationship whatsoever.61 
Given the disagreement among experts with regard to alcohol and 
tobacco, it seems impossible to estimate with any precision the net 
effects of store enforcement on cannabis. One might suspect that it 
has some effect (i.e., that alternative sources do not substitute 
completely), but the magnitude of that effect may or may not be 
significant. Some policies (like PUP laws) might help tip the scales 
toward a net reduction in use, but a decision maker concerned with 
both health and criminal outcomes may find the cost in excess of the 
returns. 
VII. Implications for Washington’s and 
Colorado’s Ability to Control Cannabis 
Supply to Underage Users 
Comparisons between cannabis and tobacco or alcohol have their 
uses and limits. Some of the issues at hand are fundamental and non-
specific to any given substance, such as how youth seek and find 
prohibited substances, and how vendors respond to the threat of 
 
in P.M. Ling et al.’s methodology that renders the study scientifically 
invalid). 
59. See, e.g., Paula M. Lantz et al., Investing in Youth Tobacco Control: A 
Review of Smoking Prevention and Control Strategies, 9 Tobacco 
Control 47, 60 (2000) (noting that prior antismoking programs 
directed at adolescents “have had mixed results” and “that no one 
approach is likely to reverse that finding”). 
60. See, e.g., Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Enforcement of Underage Sales 
Laws as a Predictor of Daily Smoking Among Adolescents: A National 
Study, 9 BMC Pub. Health 107 (2009) (finding that increasing 
merchant compliance with the law decreases youth smoking rates); C. 
Dent & A. Biglan, Relation Between Access to Tobacco and Adolescent 
Smoking, 13 Tobacco Control 334 (2005); Leonard A. Jason, Steven 
B. Pokorny & Michael E. Schoeny, Evaluating the Effects of 
Enforcements and Fines on Youth Smoking, 13 Critical Pub. Health 
33 (2003); Steven B. Pokorny, Leonard A. Jason & Michael E. Schoeny, 
The Relation of Retail Tobacco Availability on Initiation and Continued 
Smoking, 32 J. Clinical Child Adolescent Psychol. 193 (2003). 
61. See, e.g., Carey Conley Thomson et al., Effect of Local Youth-Access 
Regulations on Progression to Established Smoking Among Youths in 
Massachusetts, 16 Tobacco Control 119, 123–25 (2007) (finding “no 
significant association between . . . regulations and adolescents’ initia-
tion of smoking”); see also Fichtenberg & Glantz, supra note 57, at 1091 
(finding no benefit to “[y]outh access interventions”). 
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sanctions. But the comparison is not perfect. Applying these lessons 
to cannabis control requires considering these differences. 
A. Controlling Store Purchase Will Be Easier Under New Regulations 
Both Colorado and Washington have many fewer licensed vendors 
for cannabis—capped at 334 in Washington62 and approximately 306 
and growing in Colorado63—than for alcohol or tobacco, whose 
licensees number in the thousands. That might be important. Lantz et 
al. have identified the most effective retail enforcement programs as 
those that confront a smaller pool of vendors, with penalties that 
gradually increase with each offense.64 Lancaster and Stead believe 
that density of vendors matters, since densely located vendors allow 
youth to select from a wider number of retailers.65 
For cannabis, license penalties for selling to minors begin more 
severe and more quickly escalate to license revocation. In Washington, 
license revocation becomes available after five underage tobacco sales66 
or four alcohol sales67 in a two-year period, compared with only three 
cannabis sales in a three-year period.68 In Colorado, the maximum 
penalty facing vendors making underage tobacco sales is a $15,000 
fine,69 while four underage alcohol sales in a two-year period can merit 
license revocation70; underage cannabis sale can return a fine up to 
$100,000 or license revocation according to discretion of the State 
Licensing Authority.71 
Also, because cannabis stores are not allowed to sell anything 
besides cannabis, underage users are not even allowed to enter, 
constructing a first-line defense against the opportunity for illegal 
 
62. FAQs on I-502, Wash. St. Liquor Control Board (last visited Jan. 
22, 2015), http://www.liq.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502 (“334 retail li-
censes will be issued. The number of retail locations was determined 
using a formula that distributes the number of locations proportionate 
to the most populous cities within each county.”). 
63. MED Licensed Retail Marijuana Stores as of December 1, 2014, Colo. 
Dep’t Revenue Enforcement Division (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www. 
colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Stores.pdf (listing 306 licensed 
retail marijuana stores). 
64. Lantz et al., supra note 59, at 58. 
65. Stead & Lancaster, supra note 40, at 175.  
66. Wash. Admin. Code § 314-55-525 (2013). 
67. Wash. Admin. Code § 314-29-020 (2009). 
68. Wash. Rev. Code § 70.155.100 (2006). 
69. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-12 (2011). 
70. Colo. Code Regs. § 203-2-47-604 (2015). 
71. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-12 (2011); Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2 
(2013). 
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purchase. Preventing youth from buying from cannabis stores may be 
more like preventing them from buying a drink at a bar than buying 
a can of beer at a convenience store. 
B. Controlling Cannabis Resale Is Especially Difficult 
Cannabis gray markets might be difficult to control for the same 
reasons that have helped its black markets thrive despite law 
enforcement pressure: low-level distribution is moderately profitable, 
operationally simple, and carries relatively low criminal risk. 
Cannabis is compact, especially compared with alcohol but even 
compared with tobacco. A Ziploc sandwich bag can easily hold one 
ounce of mid-grade cannabis, which might sell for approximately $250 
and represent fifty to seventy joints.72 One-eighth of that might last 
several weeks for a frequent user, whereas the same volume of 
cigarettes would last just a few days. Moreover, the few transactions 
necessary to provide for underage users are difficult to detect, as most 
youth acquire their cannabis from friends or relatives, as with 
tobacco. 
A significant number of users old enough to buy state-licensed 
cannabis already partake in resale. NSDUH data reveal that younger 
users are much more likely to have sold some of their most recent 
purchase: the rate for users under eighteen (10.8%) is nearly twice 
that for users between twenty-one and twenty-five (6.3%), which is in 
turn twice that for users thirty-five or older (1.9%). The under-
twenty-one prohibition makes nearly half (40%) of these resellers 
ineligible as proxy buyers but still leaves 587,000 over-twenty-one 
users who resold in 2013.73 
One might theorize that as long as there remains a price 
differential between cannabis on store shelves and on street corners, 
those users with low incomes and who are already buying cannabis 
anyway might be willing to arbitrage prices by selling to friends or 
friends-of-friends. NSDUH responses show nearly 1.4 million past-
month cannabis users aged twenty-one to twenty-five with incomes 
under $20,000, and another 1.3 million with incomes between $20,000 
and $50,000.74 
 
72. Data for the Price of Weed in United States, Price of Weed, http:// 
www.priceofweed.com/prices/United-States.html (last visited Feb. 19, 
2015). The authors’ calculations are based on the PriceOfWeed.com 
price index, which lists an ounce of medium quality cannabis at $257.68. 
Mid-grade cannabis is estimated by the author to have 10% THC. 
Washington and Colorado establish servings sizes of 10mg THC. 
73. SAMHSA, supra note 13 (authors’ calculations). 
74. Id.  
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VIII. Comparison of Policies/Scenarios 
Before reviewing policy alternatives, it is useful to first identify 
some hypothetical policy outcomes, comparing them in terms of 
desirability and plausibility. The table below charts different end-
game scenarios for states with legalized cannabis. The columns 
represent the volume or ease of access via three different illegal 
channels: gray markets, black markets, and underage purchase from 
legal stores. Each row represents a scenario. 
As a foil, the table includes two rows for tobacco, distinguishing 
the situation before versus after passage of the Synar Amendment. 
The Synar Amendment sharply cut underage youth’s direct access to 
tobacco (from “substantial” to “minimal”) thanks to states increasing 
enforcement of laws against sale to minors, but it had no meaningful 
effect on indirect access via the gray market. (It also had no effect on 
black market access, which was effectively nil for tobacco both before 
and after the Synar Amendment.) 
We similarly chart hypothetical scenarios in cannabis control. 
Each trades off between access to gray and black markets and hence 
also between qualitatively different types of societal harms (i.e., 
underage cannabis use versus black market activity). None of these 
scenarios can be said to be objectively better than the others, except 
for the post-legalization “impossible ideal,” which is included just to 
illustrate the best possible scenario: minimal access through every 
illegal channel. 
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Table 1: Ease of Access Under Specific Enforcement Regimes  
 
 Direct 
(Underage) 
Access to 
Legal 
Stores 
Indirect Access 
to Legal 
Product via 
Gray Market 
Diversion 
Black Market Access 
Tobacco    
Pre-Synar Substantial Substantial N/A 
Post-Synar Minimal Substantial N/A 
Cannabis    
Impossible Ideal Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Pre-legalization N/A Modest in some 
medical states 
(WA, CA, OR, 
CO) 
Substantial 
Option 1: 
“Aggressive” 
Enforcement 
Minimal Minimal  Substantial 
Option 2: 
“Permissive” 
Enforcement 
Minimal Substantial Substantial initially; 
falling as the black 
market is driven out 
of business 
 
The “Pre-legalization” scenario reflects the situation before 
legalization (and before de facto quasi-legalization via very permissive 
medical marijuana regimes). Access was dominated by black markets; 
underage access via stores was nil because there were no state-licensed 
stores. “Option 1” and “Option 2” demonstrate the two principle 
possible outcomes of cannabis legalization. Option 1 typifies an 
“aggressive” enforcement approach, which attempts to limit all chan-
nels of underage access. Option 2 demonstrates a “permissive” ap-
proach, grudgingly tolerating leakage from cannabis stores and so 
putting greater pressure on cannabis from black markets.  
So, were we to choose between those two, how would we pick? 
Option 2 allows equal or greater levels of cannabis access at first, 
but its outcomes improve over time as underage users migrate from 
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black market supply to diverted state-licensed supply. Black market 
volumes retreat, as do associated criminal revenues, acts of illegal 
production and trafficking, and related arrests. Things also change 
from the prospective of the potential user. An eighteen-year-old might 
still easily find a sibling or classmate willing to resell him store-bought 
cannabis, but instead of receiving the usual Ziploc baggie, he or she 
will be buying cannabis that is tested and labeled for potency. 
Option 1 is more ambitious. It attempts to accomplish with 
cannabis what we failed to do with alcohol or tobacco. Success seems 
especially unlikely given the increasingly tolerant attitudes toward 
cannabis use. A heavy majority (69%) of Americans believe that 
cannabis is less harmful to a person’s health than alcohol.75 Further, 
cannabis came dead last (8%) in a nationwide poll that asked Amer-
icans which was the most harmful substance between cannabis, 
tobacco (49%), alcohol (24%), and even sugar (15%).76 If controlling 
cannabis gray markets depends on public attitudes being hostile to 
cannabis use, we would be off to a bad start. 
Even if gray markets could be stamped out, there is the 
disadvantage of fortifying black markets. Unless there is a big drop-off 
in under-twenty-one cannabis use—a reversal from the recent upward 
trend—Option 1 would lock into place the nearly one-quarter of 
today’s current black market that services that demographic, 
representing roughly $6–10 billion in illegal revenues. That also helps 
black markets service the remaining (adult) demand for black market 
cannabis (e.g., by undercutting legal prices if taxes are high enough).  
So, given a simple choice between Options 1 and 2, even a 
moderate concern for illicit markets suggests choosing Option 2. What 
makes that choice even more clear is that Option 2 is also more 
realistic.  
One might then ask what tactics would compose “permissive” 
enforcement? Operationally, authorities should continue to combat 
underage store purchase yet refrain from tackling gray market diver-
sion. Law enforcement should vigorously investigate stores that sell to 
underage users but not the parent suspected of passing along cannabis 
to their nineteen-year-old, or the college student with the several-
ounce-per-week purchasing habit obviously too large for personal 
consumption. A strategy that maintains these priorities in the long 
term might be dubbed “permissive.” 
 
75. Seth Motel, Six Facts About Marijuana, Pew Res. Center (Nov. 5 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/05/6-facts-about 
-marijuana/. 
76. Beth Reinhard, WSJ Poll: Candy Is Dandy but Pot Is Less Harmful 
Wall St. J. (March 12, 2014, 6:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2014/03/12/wsj-poll-cand-is-dandy-but-pot-is-less-harmful/tab/print/?mg 
=blogs-wsj&url=http%253A%252F%252Fblogs.wsj.com%25%E2%80%A6. 
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Yet, we need not permanently confine ourselves to such modest 
aims. In the long run, if and when gray markets have largely taken 
the place of black markets as the primary supply to youth and young 
adults, targeting gray market supply might be more attractive. Fewer 
underage black market buyers has wide-reaching implications: for 
those continuing to sell illicit cannabis, smaller economies of scale and 
so higher costs of producing and distribution cannabis; for street-level 
cannabis retailers, fewer with reliable contacts to illicit producers; and 
for end customers, a growing preference for state-licensed cannabis 
due to falling prices and perhaps even social norms increasingly hos-
tile to buying illicit cannabis. So, an alternative approach would res-
pond to these changing circumstances by ramping up controls against 
gray market diversion. We might call that the “patient” approach.  
Then, should policy be permissive of gray markets or merely 
patient? The patient approach is superior if everything went as 
planned, but in practice it carries additional risk. It might backfire if 
policymakers were too early in imposing controls on gray market 
supply, perhaps due to political pressures, or overestimating the dam-
age to black market production and distribution rings, or underesti-
mating their ability to bounce back to larger scales of business. In 
either case, policymakers need not decide now. So long as one is 
committed to the opening steps common to both approaches, and is 
satisfied in making at least a short-run concession to gray market 
access, decisions about what to do in the long run could be saved for 
the long run. 
Conclusion 
As cannabis legalization is adopted state-by-state, it creates com-
peting harms and benefits. On the one hand, there is concern that 
easier access to cannabis could increase use by youth and young 
adults; on the other hand, reducing illicit market share and minimiz-
ing cannabis-related arrests and incarcerations are also worthwhile 
goals. Nor is this simply a state–federal conflict, as both sets of some-
times competing goals are simultaneously adopted in the letter of 
both state legalization bills and federal enforcement guidelines. 
Laws in Colorado and Washington clearly prohibit cannabis sales 
to users under twenty-one. But making a rule is not the same as 
enforcing it. Legally produced cannabis will still reach minors, either 
because minors succeed in purchasing directly from licensed retail 
outlets or because adult buyers illegally give or resell what they have 
legally purchased. That raises important questions: if efforts to limit 
access are inevitably flawed, how vigorously should they be pursued? 
Should efforts focus simultaneously on store purchase and gray and 
black markets; or, knowing that pushing down on one channel causes 
the other to pop up, should they pick just the most dangerous 
methods of access and focus on that? 
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Three alternate approaches can be identified, varying according to 
the style of enforcement applied to gray market access: one that is 
aggressive, one permissive, and one patient. We propose that the 
aggressive approach is unlikely to achieve its desired outcome—
simultaneously shutting down both gray and black markets—and, 
furthermore, it may backfire. A permissive approach avoids inflaming 
the black market and avoids some of the harms associated with a 
vigorous law enforcement response. A patient approach offers all that 
and possibly more: by imposing controls on gray market access but 
only after the retreat of black market activity, it makes possible a 
long-run scenario with lower levels of access across all channels.  
Of course, it is a difficult sell politically for authorities to 
systematically ignore gray market supply to youth. To the public, 
that may seem like a failure of imagination or political will. State 
authorities are unlikely to publicly acknowledge that they plan for 
licensed stores to provide cannabis for underage users, albeit 
indirectly; likewise, the federal government is probably loath to open 
loopholes in the enforcement guidelines set out in the later Cole 
Memo. A more plausible scenario is for governments to simply conceal 
the controversial details. This might be described as form of “don’t 
ask, don’t tell.” The federal government does not ask states if they 
are succeeding at controlling underage gray market access; in turn, 
states do not tell that they are not even trying. And in public 
statements, everyone could claim to be doing their best to stop under-
age cannabis access of all kinds. 
Of course there can be no certainty about the predictions made 
above; underage consumers and legal, gray-market, and illegal canna-
bis vendors might not respond precisely as we imagine to various 
hypothetical situations. Still, it seems likely that there are trade-offs 
between efforts to stop underage purchase, to stop diversion from 
state-licensed stores, and to stop illicit production and sale. A 
corollary is that the goals of minimizing underage cannabis use and 
minimizing illicit market activity cannot be simultaneously pursued 
with maximal effectiveness for each. Perhaps the most reasonable 
policy response would be to settle these issues sequentially, first 
seeking reductions in black market activity while also preventing 
direct access by minors to licensed sales, and only later turning to 
focus on minimizing underage access to cannabis through the gray 
market.  
